Institutions and Political Inequality

WZB Advisory Board Meeting

Who we are

Who we are

Where we are working

Themes

  • Vertical linkages
  • Horizontal contestation
  • Exclusion
  • Elite connections

Themes

  • Vertical linkages
  • Horizontal contestation
  • Exclusion
  • Elite networks

Vertical linkages

How do citizens control elites (and vice versa)?

Horizontal contestation

What determines between group cohesion and conflict?

Exclusion

How do citizens respond to political exclusion?

Elite networks

What is the structure of elite networks?

How we work

IPI principles


  1. Engaged research

  2. Ethical research

  3. Premium on quality

  4. Supportive environment

How we work

IPI principles


  1. Engaged research •

  2. Ethical research

  3. Premium on quality •

  4. Supportive environment

1. Engaged research

We are outward looking, inclusive, committed to co-production and transfer

  • German development community: DFG / GIZ / Deneb
  • World Food Program
  • US state department, USAID, US Dept of Labor
  • EGAP policy events (with IGO, NGO, government audiences) – The Hague (2018), Geneva (2019), London (2023)
  • Kampala City Authority
  • Sierra Leone Ministry of Agriculture
  • Nigeria Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons

Supporting international scholars:

  • EGAP Africa researcher trainings (Humphreys)
  • Kenya Busara trainings (Scacco)
  • Africa journalist training (Garbe)
  • South Asian network mentoring (McMurry)

Our members sit on committees allocating research funding in the development sector:

  • IPA peace and recovery
  • HFG fellows selection
  • Deval

3. Premium on quality

With a commitment to open science practices.

Formal design declarations for transparency and diagnostics

Bayesian approaches to integrated qualitative and quantitative data

Publication strategy: We favor fewer publications in high impact outlets.
Since 2017 have appeared in:

  • Leading general science journals, including Nature Medicine, Nature Human Behavior, PNAS, PLOS medicine and Plos One, and Science Advances (twice).

  • All three of the the “top 3” political science journals: APSR (3 times) , AJPS, and JOP (twice)

  • Two of the leading development journals: World Development and JDE (twice each).

  • The leading methodology journals in political science (PA) and in sociology (SRM).

  • Excellent UPs: 2.5 Cambridge University Press, Princeton University Press.

Three Projects


  • Horizontal contestations: Alex Scacco
  • Vertical Linkages: Lisa Garbe
  • Horizontal and vertical interactions: Jonah Foong

Horizontal contestations: Building bridges?

Scacco

Motivation

Contact hypothesis:

  • If cooperative and egalitarian, social contact can reduce prejudice
  • But: Real-world opportunities for contact in conflict settings often limited
  • And: Even given opportunities, anxiety can lead to avoidance
  • Mass media interventions as potential solution

Research question: Can media interventions improve intergroup relations in settings of horizontal contestation?

Challenges

  1. There is self-selection into media consumption

  2. How to generate media content that resonates with audiences on both sides of deep social divide

  3. How to deliver in a naturalistic way with broad reach

Design

  1. Self-selection into media consumption

    • Use experimental design to encourage subset of study subjects (N=1750) in conflict setting (Kaduna, Nigeria) to watch TV drama each week
      • Weekly reminders and incentivized quizzes to boost take-up
  2. Create content that resonates across social divide

    • Work with local TV scriptwriters to design relatable storyline focused on transformative Christian-Muslim friendship
  3. Deliver content in naturalistic way with broad reach

    • Embed storyline into 10 episodes of primetime show, “Dadin Kowa”

Kaduna: a divided and unequal city


  • Christian-Muslim clashes:
    • 2000, 2002, 2011, 2012
  • 58% personally witnessed a Christian-Muslim clash
  • 46% had family member killed in Christian-Muslim clash
  • Stark segregation
  • Political and economic inequality

Results 1: Negative Sentiment


  • Note: Effects stronger for politically dominant Muslim group

Results 2: (Weaker) Positive Sentiment

  • Note: Effects stronger for politically dominant Muslim group

What have we learned?

  • Current focus on divisive effects of media
  • But: Media interventions can reduce prejudice, threat perceptions and increase intergroup interaction in conflict setting
  • Next stages: Study knock-on effects of greater acceptance by politically dominant groups for social inequalities

Vertical linkages: Who Wants to Be Legible?

Garbe, McMurry, Scacco, Zhang

Motivation

  • Large-scale efforts to improve vertical citizen-state legibility across developing countries

  • Example: introduction of biometric identity cards (eID)

  • Two aspects of expansion of state capacity:

    • Improved service delivery
    • Greater scope for state surveillance
  • Differential implications across social groups:

  • Question: Does eID exacerbate existing intergroup inequalities, and if so, under what conditions?

Challenges

  1. Sampling and surveying marginalized populations

  2. Explaining complex policy choices in an accessible way

  3. Assessing actual effects of eID on political inequality

Design

  1. Sampling and surveying of marginalized populations

    • In-person survey in Kenya (N = 2073) with members of dominant (Kikuyu, Kalenjin), opposition (Luo), and securitized (Somali) groups
  1. Explaining complex policy choices in an accessible way

    • Hypothetical policies highlighting different benefits and costs
  1. Assessing effects of eID on political inequality

    • Policy conjoint experiment
    • Focus on heterogeneity in attitudes across groups
    • Implications for changes in group-level political behavior

Conjoint attributes


  • Hypothesized benefits








  • Hypothesized costs

Results 1: Main effects

Figure 1. Willingness to register for eID
  • Overall positive reactions to all eID policy features

  • But securitized group less positive, especially about surveillance

Results 2: Secondary effects

Figure 2. Left panel: ‘I would be worried about the police using my personal information’, right panel: ‘I would be worried about being punished for expressing my political views’
  • Opposition group more worried about consequences of surveillance for political participation

What have we learned?

  • Overall: Citizens appreciate stronger link with government through eID
  • But: Some evidence that particular groups may suffer from
    • Direct exclusion from access to service (securitized)
    • Indirect exclusion via reduced participation (opposition)
  • Ambiguous effects for inequality

Horizontal and vertical interactions: Discrimination and candidate selection

Foong, Humphreys, Kasara

Motivation

  • How does horizontal contestation affect outcomes at the vertical level?

  • Three forms of horizontal contestation: gender, group based, and the interaction between the two (intersectional discrimination)

  • Vertical outcomes: How does discrimination affect the choice and quality of political representation?

  • How are these moderated by institutional features commonly used to tackle discrimination?

    • Gender quotas
    • Information on ability
    • Collective choices

Challenges

  • Self-selection into candidacy
  • Endogenous selection of institutions
  • Mixed incentives

These all make causal inferences from observational patterns difficult

Design 1

  • We conduct a candidate choice experiment in Nairobi

  • Participants were asked to pick candidates to perform a task

  • Controlled setting features dual aspects of elections:

    • direct rewards to candidates for selection independent of quality
    • direct rewards to electors from selection conditional on quality

Design 2

  • Avatars represent real candidates

Results 1: Who gets chosen?

Term Beta SE
Baseline discrimination
outgroup -0.08*** 0.017
female -0.03* 0.014
female * outgroup 0.05 0.037
Institutional effects on discrimination
quota * female 0.14*** 0.016
information * female -0.05** 0.020
discussion * female 0.00 0.037
quota * outgroup 0.02 0.021
information * outgroup 0.02 0.024
discussion * outgroup 0.18* 0.079
Institutional effects on intersectional discrimination
quota * female * outgroup -0.01 0.048
information * female * outgroup -0.04 0.053
discussion * female * outgroup -0.08 0.174

Results 2: How institutions affect candidate quality

What have we learned?

  • Little evidence for causal interactions between ethnicity and gender
  • Evidence that institutions moderate the relationship between contestation and candidate quality:
    • Quotas remove (in fact reverse) gender bias but weaken candidate quality
    • Information hurts women but improves candidate quality
    • Discussions remove only outgroup bias and improve candidate quality

Horizontal biases affect the quality of representation, but biases can be moderated by institutional context

The Future

Clusters

  • Vertical linkages
  • Horizontal contestation
  • Exclusion
  • Elite networks

Directions

  • We expect a deepening of between-cluster analyses: How do horizontal contestation enhance or weaken vertical linkages?
  • We expect a deepening of work on elite networks Can we generate a global database of political connections?
  • We remain committed to deepening collaboration with Global South researchers

Fin

Extra slides

Results 1: Test scores breakdown

Test is not gender neutral but is evenly distributed across ethnicity

readRDS("assets/kenya/scores_ethnic.rds")